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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on March 21,
1989.

Appellant filed her Petition for Rehearing on April 4, 1989.

The Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition
for Writ of Certiorari must be filed.
Supreme Court (1986).

"Rule 451c), Rules of the \3tah

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is

therefore timely filed pursuant to Rule 45, Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp.
1988).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended).

Ms. Johnson

was found guilty on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

The Court of Appeals

affirmed her conviction in a decision dated March 21, 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Stroud stopped a 1972 Mercury
Capri with a broken brake light (T. 5-6). Prior to approaching the
vehicle, the officer ran a check on the license plates and obtained
the name of the registered owner (T. 6 ) . He then approached the
driver and asked for identification (T. 6 ) .
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The driver produced a driver's license but was unable to
produce registration which the officer requested when he learned
that the driver was not the registered owner (T. 6 ) . The officer
then asked the passenger, the Petitioner in this case, for
identification (T. 6-7).1

Petitioner told the officer she did not

have identification but gave him her name and date of birth.

The

deputy took the driver's license and information from Petitioner to
his vehicle where he called dispatch and inquired whether there were
any outstanding warrants on Petitioner (T. 7, 15). The deputy
testified that he ran a check on Ms. Johnson n[b]ecause there was a
possibility that [the] vehicle could have been stolen" (T. 7-8).
However, the officer did not ask the driver how she came
to be in possession of the vehicle or otherwise attempt to ascertain
whether the vehicle was stolen by questioning the driver or
Petitioner.

The officer also did not run a check to determine

whether the car was stolen (T. 12) and acknowledged that it was not
unusual to stop cars and find that the owner was not driving (T. 17,
18).
The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16) and the only

1 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied
on the trial judge's statement "that where there is a legitimate
traffic stop, the driver has a suspended license, and there is 'no
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and whether they have
permission to drive it because the owner is not present,' a
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the identity of a
passenger." Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. However, the
officer did not learn that the driver's license was suspended until
after he detained Ms. Johnson and ran a warrants check on her
(T. 8 ) . Both courts erred in relying on this information.
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information which made the officer speculate that it might be stolen
was the fact that the registered owner was not driving and the
driver was unable to find registration materials (T. 7-8). Other
than being a passenger in the vehicle, Ms. Johnson did not say or do
anything which would suggest that, even if the vehicle were stolen,
she was involved in the criminal activity.
The officer further acknowledged that ascertaining
whether Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him
determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15) but claimed that if
Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly"
would think it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16).
The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21).
Several minutes after the officer returned to his
vehicle, dispatch informed him that the driver had a suspended
license and Ms. Johnson had an outstanding traffic warrant (T. 7, 8,
15).

The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and, incident to that arrest,

searched her bag and found the evidence which gave rise to the
instant case (T. 9-11).
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress
all evidence seized from her person or property on the grounds that
the items seized were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her person
in violation of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution.
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See Appendix C.

The trial

court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the motion
"unless defendant can submit law to the contrary" (R. 17). See
trial judge's ruling from the bench, T. 35-36, as set forth in
Appendix D.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE DETENTION OF PETITIONER
FOR A WARRANTS CHECK IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW.
A majority of the panel in the Court of Appeals which
heard the instant case held that the officer had a reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson under
the fourth amendment.

Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-6.

Judge

Orme dissented, stating simply:
The only facts relied on by the officer were that
the driver's name was not the name of the
registered owner and the driver was not able to
locate the registration certificate. These facts
are just as consistent with the more likely
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its
rightful owner. Absent more—and this is all the
officer pointed to—there was simply no
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, that
the car had been stolen.
Id. at 36.

In reaching its decision, the majority misconstrued the

facts in this case and misapplied the law.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to the general probable
cause requirement under the fourth amendment.

In order to justify a

particular detention, an officer must be able to point to specific
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articulable facts which, when viewed under an objective standard,
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is
about to commit a crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

This Court and the Utah

Court of Appeals have applied that standard in numerous cases.

See

e.g. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam);
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986); State v. Trujillo, 739
P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988).
As the Court of Appeals held (and the State did not
dispute in its brief), the officer seized Ms. Johnson within the
meaning of the fourth amendment when he detained her to run a
warrants check.

See Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35; see also

United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (detaining a
defendant for a warrants check is a seizure under the fourth
amendment and requires that the officer have a reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify the seizure).
The only articulable facts known to the officer at the
time he detained Ms. Johnson were that the driver was not the owner
of the vehicle and the driver could not find the registration.

The

Court of Appeals erred in relying on the trial court's statement that
where there is a legitimate traffic stop, the
driver has a suspended license, and there is "no
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and
whether they have permission to drive it because
the owner is not present," a reasonable officer
would inquire regarding the identity of a
passenger.
104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35 (emphasis added).
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Contrary to the

assertions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the officer
did not know that the driver's license was suspended when he
detained the passenger (T. 8 ) . The officer simply asked the
Petitioner her name immediately after obtaining identification from
the driver, because it was his normal procedure to run the name and
date of birth of passengers in traffic stops and he routinely used
this practice to pick up people who might have outstanding warrants
(T. 20, 21).
In an attempt to justify the detention, the officer
testified that he ran a check on Petitioner

n

[b]ecause there was a

possibility that [the] vehicle could have been stolen" (T. 7-8).
However, he did not ask the driver or Petitioner who owned the car
or how the driver came to be in possession of it.

Nor did he run a

check to see whether it was stolen (T. 12) or otherwise pursue that
"possibility.n
A "possibility" is not equivalent to a constitutionally
required reasonable articulable suspicion.

It is more along the

lines of a hunch or speculation, neither of which support a seizure
under the fourth amendment.

See State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 90

(Utah App. 1987) .
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does
not automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity.
See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986).

"[A]

person's mere presence in the company of others whom the police have
probable cause to search does not provide probable cause to search
that person."

J[<3. citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587,
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68 S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948).
Furthermore, assuming arguendo the meager facts known to
the officer at the time he detained Ms. Johnson did in some way
amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was
stolen and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer
exceeded the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained
Ms. Johnson to run a warrants check on her.

The permissible scope

of any detention would be limited to investigation necessary to
ascertain whether the vehicle was in fact stolen.2

The officer

acknowledged that ascertaining whether Ms. Johnson had a valid
driver's license would not help him determine whether the car was
stolen (T. 15). Furthermore, all of his actions and his testimony
(T. 20, 21) indicated that he did not believe the car was stolen but
was on a "fishing expedition" to see whether he could find some
basis for arresting either occupant of the vehicle.
Under the circumstances of this case, the officer
detained Ms. Johnson based on a hunch, speculation or "possibility"
and not a constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion.
While at first glance this case may seem somewhat
inconsequential, the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeals
could be overwhelming.

It leaves officers with unbridled discretion

to detain and run a warrants check on all passengers in vehicles
where the owner is not present.

Persons who look a little different

2 The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16). Ms. Johnson
was riding with a friend to pick up a child at school (T. 24).
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or who officers want to "shake down" will be detained while
wealthier, more mainstream people riding in borrowed cars will not
be seized for warrants checks.
Even though common sense and the police officer in the
instant case agree that it is not unusual to stop cars and find that
the owner is not present (T. 17, 18) and even though the absence of
the registered owner is as consistent with innocent behavior as it
is with criminal behavior (104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36, Orme, J.,
dissenting), officers will be free to detain all occupants of a
vehicle who are riding in borrowed cars.

Such a result does not

comport with the freedoms guaranteed by our society or with the
reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment,
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court grant
her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue.

POINT II. IN REACHING ITS DECISION THAT APPELLANT
FAILED TO PRESERVE THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
FOR REVIEW, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT
BEEN', BUT SHOULD BE, DECIDED
1
BY THIS COURT.
In her opening brief before the Court of Appeals,
Appellant/Petitioner argued that her detention violated Utah
statutory and constitutional law.
9-12.

See Appellant's opening brief at

She argued that the search and seizure provision of the Utah

Constitution offers a greater protection than its federal
counterpart and cited several cases from other jurisdictions which
had been decided on state constitutional grounds in support of her
argument, e.g. State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978).

See

Appendix E for entire text of Petitioner's argument on this issue in
her opening brief.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals declined to address
this argument because "defendant failed to brief or argue these
issues at the trial level . . . ."
Rep. 34, 35 (Utah App. 1989).

State v. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv.

The Court stated that " [ nominally

alluding to such different constitutional guarantees without any
analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the
issue to permit consideration by this Court on appeal [citation
omitted]."

Id.
In her written Motion to Suppress in the instant case,

Petitioner specifically stated that the Utah Constitution had been
violated.3

in her Memorandum in Support of that Motion to

Suppress, Petitioner correctly referred to Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.

At oral argument on the Motion to Suppress,

Petitioner also referred to the Utah Constitution.

Defense counsel

stated:
. . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution as
well, although that has not been developed in the
case law very well,
T. 40. Hence, in the instant case, Petitioner specifically referred
to the state constitution and recognized that there had been no
separate analysis in making her argument to the trial court. She
afforded the trial court every opportunity to decide the issue under

3 Petitioner erroneously referred to Article I,
Section 13 of the Utah Constitution in this motion. See Appendix C,
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the Utah Constitution.
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), a majority
of this Court, comprised of Justice Hall, Justice Howe and Justice
Orme of the Court of Appeals, pointed out that this Court has never
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the Utah
Constitution and the federal constitution in the search and seizure
context.

However, in footnote 8, this Court pointed out that:
in declining to depart in this case from our
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret
Article I, Section 14 of the our constitution in a
manner different from the fourth amendment to the
federal constitution, we have by no means ruled
out the possibility of doing so in some future
case.

JEd. at 1221.
In his dissent in Watts, Justice Zimmerman pointed out
that he did not agree with the majority's assertions that the Court
had never drawn any distinctions between the two constitutions.
at 1225.

Id.

Justice Durham concurred with Justice Zimmerman's dissent.
Given the uncertainty reflected in Watts as to whether

any distinctions between the search and seizure provisions in the
two constitutions have been drawn in the past or will be drawn in
the future, defense counsel's statement that the Utah constitutional
provision "has not been developed in the case law very well" (T. 40)
raised the issue for the trial court and reflected the current state
of the law.
The decision in Watts also reflects what has become a
difficult position for criminal defense lawyers.

Criminal defense

lawyers are, for the most part, aware that this Court is interested
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in a separate analysis of issues under the Utah Constitution.
However, because very little separate Utah Constitutional case law
has been developed and because other states rarely offer a case on
point, defense lawyers often have little substance to argue other
than that if the federal constitution does not protect the
defendant, the state constitution does.

Given the paucity of state

constitutional case law, such an argument at the trial level should
preserve a Utah Constitutional issue for appellate review.
In reaching its decision that this issue had not been
preserved for appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on two opinions of
this Court, State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), and State v.
Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981).

In Lee, the defendant had argued at

the trial court that the search was unlawful, thereby making the
seizure unlawful, but had not argued that the seizure alone was
unconstitutional.

On appeal, the defendant raised the seizure issue

for the first time, and this Court refused to address it.

Lee, 633

P.2d at 52-3.
In Carter, the defendant argued at the trial court that
the frisk of his person following his arrest was unlawful.

On

appeal, he argued for the first time that the search of his backpack
was unlawful because it was out of his possession at the time of the
search.

This Court again refused to address the issue because it

had not been raised in the trial court.

Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-1.

Unlike Carter or Lee, Petitioner did not bring up the
Utah Constitutional issue for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner's argument throughout has been that the detention of her
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person, where she was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a faulty
equipment violation, was unlawful.

She in fact raised the Utah

constitutional issue in the trial court and recognized that a
separate Utah Constitutional analysis has not yet been developed in
case law.

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) is

merely a codification of the constitutional protections against
search and seizure and is raised implicitly when either the federal
or state constitutional provision is argued.
The haste with which matters proceed to trial and the
practical realities of criminal defense practice rarely offer trial
attorneys the opportunity to fully research an issue, especially in
an area where this Court or the Court of Appeals has not yet issued
an opinion and the likelihood that the trial court would rule
favorably is slim.

The impact of the Johnson decision, if it is

allowed to remain as the Court of Appeals has written it, may be
that this Court and the Court of Appeals will see less briefing on
state constitutional issues because in most cases, even where trial
counsel separately referred to the state constitution, there will be
a serious preservation issue on appeal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give
criminal defendants a clear picture of the extent of argument which
is necessary at the trial court level in order to preserve a state
constitutional issue for appeal.

Where provisions of the state

constitution have not been analyzed in case law requiring trial
counsel to do more than name the applicable provision of the Utah
Constitution leaves appellate and trial counsel in a "never-never
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land" where it is unclear in almost any case where little analysis
exists as to what exactly must be done to preserve an issue.

The

next step from Johnson is to refuse to review an issue on appeal
because in making his argument on appeal, defendant emphasizes a
case which he did not rely on at the trial court level.

Such a

position would turn the requirement that an issue be preserved at
trial into an elaborate game for which no one knows the precise
rules.
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court grant a
writ of certiorari on this issue, issue a bright line ruling that
argument at the trial court that a specific article and section of
the Utah Constitution is violated is sufficient to preserve a Utah
Constitutional issue for appellate review, and address the Utah
constitutional issue raised in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues
addressed herein.
SUBMITTED this

V

day of May, 1989.

tUx-h-'

DEBRA-K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
this V

day of May, 1989.

<^$4~C.CL&*<
J0SN C. WATT
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DELIVERED by

this

of May, 1989.
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The STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870222-CA
FILED: March 21, 1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
ATTORNEYS:
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
Dan R. Larsen, R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake
City, for Respondents
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Orme.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:

had the name "Karen" on it. Defendant initially denied that the backpack belonged to her,
but later admitted that it was hers. Incident to
her arrest, the bag was searched and was
found to contain amphetamines, drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah identification.
Defendant's version of the sequence of
events varies from Stroud's. She testified that
after Stroud received the driver's license, he
asked defendant if she had any identification.
She said that she did not. He told them to
wait, that he would be right back, and returned to his vehicle for fi\e or ten minutes,
long enough for her to smoke a cigarette or
two. When he returned, he asked for the registration certificate. When it could not be
produced, Stroud asked defendant to return to
his vehicle with him, where, at his request, she
gave him her name and birthdate. He then
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen minutes
later, he came back to their car, gave the
driver a citation, took defendant out of the
car, frisked and handcuffed her, and put her
in the front seat of the sheriffs car. She had
possession of her bag at this time. Defendant
stated that she gave Stroud her name and
birthdate because she was required to do so,
and did not believe that she could leave.
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether defendant may raise, for the first time on appeal,
the argument that state law and article 1
section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide
greater protection than the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution against
unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether
defendant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3) if there was a seizure,
whether it was reasonable.
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation unless its
findings are clearly erroneous. State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The
trial judge is in the best position to assess the
credibility and accuracy of the witnesses'
divergent testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 102
Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Ct. App. Feb. 15,
1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). However, in assessing the trial
court's legal conclusions based upon its
factual findings, we afford it no deference but
apply a "correction of error" standard. Oafes
v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,659 (Utah 1988).

Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals
the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and her conviction for possession of a
controlled substance.1 We affirm.
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a faulty
brake light. Defendant was a passenger in that
vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Stroud
testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he
ran a check on the license plate and obtained
the name of the registered owner. He then
approached the stopped vehicle and asked the
driver for her license. The name on the license
was not the name of the registered owner.
When Stroud requested the registration certificate, the driver was unable to produce it.
Stroud then asked defendant for identification, reasoning that there was a possibility the
car was stolen because there was no registration and no owner present. After initially
denying that she had any identification, defendant told Stroud her name and birthdate.
Stating that he would be right back and
expecting the driver and defendant to remain,
Stroud returned to his vehicle and ran license
checks on the two, determining that the driver
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
was driving on a suspended license and that
Defendant claims that her detention violated
defendant had several outstanding warrants.
He did not, however, inquire as to whether the the fourth amendment of the United States
car was stolen, nor did he know of any reports Constitution and article 1 section 14 of the
of stolen cars matching that car's description. Utah Constitution. She also argues that the
He then wrote a citation on the driver and legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §777-15 (1980) was to provide greater protection
requested a backup police officer.
When defendant was informed that she was against unreasonable searches and seizures
being arrested for outstanding warrants, she than is provided by the fourth amendment,
exited the vehicle, holding a backpack which and that her seizure violated the provisions of
UTAH ADVA CE REPORTS
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both constitutions.2 However, defendant failed I (5th Cir. 1984), wherein the Fifth Circuit
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level specified three constitutionally permissible
and first raised her statutory argument in her levels of police stops:
appellate brief. Nominally alluding to such
(1) an officer may approach a
different constitutional guarantees without any
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
analysis before the trial court does not suffiquestions so long as the citizen is
ciently raise the issue to permit consideration
not detained against his will; (2) an
by this court on appeal. James v. Preston, 746
officer may seize a person if the
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "[W]here
officer has an "articulable suspia defendant fails to assert a particular ground
cion" that the person has committed
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence
or is about to commit a crime;
in the trial court, an appellate court will not
however, the "detention must be
consider that ground on appeal .... [M]otions
temporary and last no longer than
to suppress should be supported by precise
is necessary to effectuate the
averments, not conclusory allegations ...." State
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah
may arrest a suspect if the officer
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53
has probable cause to believe an
(Utah 1981), the supreme court stated:
offense has been committed or is
being committed.
There is nothing in the record to
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
indicate that the point now urged
upon this Court was unavailable or
We conclude that the present case involves a
unknown to defendant at the time
"level two" stop. Thus, to justify the seizure,
he filed his motion to suppress, and
Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable
to entertain the point now would be
suspicion" that defendant had committed a
to sanction the practice of withhocrime. To determine if he acted reasonably
lding positions that should properly
under the circumstances, "due weight must be
be presented to the trial court but
given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized
which may be withheld for the
suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reapurpose of seeking a reversal on
sonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
appeal and a new trial or dismissal.
from the facts in light of his experience." Terry
We, therefore, decline to consider this argu- v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
ment on appeal.
1883(1968).
At this point, we defer to the findings of the
SEIZURE
trial judge because of his preferred position in
Defendant avers that she was seized within evaluating the witnesses5 credibility. See
the meaning of the fourth amendment because Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. The record
she felt that she was not free to leave when indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's
Stroud told her to wait while he returned to testimony in concluding there was an articulhis vehicle to check on the driver's license and able suspicion that defendant had committed a
to run a warrants check on defendant. "A crime. Prior to asking defendant for identifiseizure within the meaning of the fourth cation, Stroud believed that there was a posamendment occurs only when the officer by sibility the car wats stolen because the owner
means of physical force or show of authority was absent and there was no registration. He
has in some way restricted the liberty of a knew that the driver was not the owner, but
person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 determined that it was reasonable to ask def(Utah Ct. App. 1987). further, "[w]hen a
reasonable person, based on the totality of the endant her name to determine if it correspocircumstances, remains, not in the spirit of nded with the owner's name he had learned
cooperation ... but because he believes he is prior to stopping the vehicle. The fact that
not free to leave," a seizure occurs. Id.; see Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. instead of a stolen vehicle check is of no great
544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Defe- significance because not all stolen cars are
ndant was, therefore, seized when Stroud took reported immediately. The trial judge stated
her name and birthdate and expected her to that where there is a legitimate traffic stop,
wait while he ran a warrants check. Under the the driver has a suspended license, and there is
totality of the circumstances, defendant was "no way of telling who the owner of the
reasonably justified in her belief that she was vehicle is and whether they have permission to
drive it because the owner is not present," a
not free to go.
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the
Now, the concern is whether the seizure was identity of a passenger. In weighing the testireasonable and permissible under the fourth mony, the court was justified in finding that
amendment. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d the amount of time defendant was required to
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), the Utah wait, even though a passenger, was reasonable
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in United and did not take any longer than a normal
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 traffic stop.
UTAH ADVA^
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Thus, there was substantial evidence for the
trial court to find as it did. Although a seizure
occurred, it conformed to constitutional requirements in that Officer Stroud had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the car could
have been stolen, and defendant was not detained for an unreasonable period of time. We,
therefore, affirm defendant's conviction.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress.
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between
these two provisions and has "always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the same." State
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988).
However, in a footnote comment, the court indicated that it has not ruled out the possibility of
making such a distinction in a future case. Id, at n.
8.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
Although the legal analysis applicable to this
case is ably set out in the majority's opinion,
I cannot agree with their ultimate conclusion
that the arresting officer had an articulable
suspicion that the automobile had been stolen,
much less that defendant had in any way
participated in the theft.
The only facts relied on by the officer were
that the driver's name was not the name of
the registered owner and the driver was not
able to locate the registration certificate. These
facts are just as consistent with the more likely
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from
its rightful owner. Absent more-and this is
all the officer pointed to-there was simply
no articulable suspicion, as a matter of law,
that the car had been stolen.
I would accordingly reverse.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford Insurance
Group,
Petitioners,
v.
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury Fund of
Utah, and Industrial Commission of Utah,
Respondents.
No. 880218-CA
FILED: March 22,1989
Industrial Commission
ATTORNEYS:
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioners.
Erie V. Boorman, Second Injury Fund, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her wrist
while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini filed a claim
with the Industrial Commission for permanent
total disability. The parties stipulated that
Pellegrini had a preexisting impairment of
46Vo prior to 1980, that she incurred an additional 129b impairment prior to 1983, that the
injury to her wrist caused another 2497b impairment, 1 and that she was now, with the wrist
injury, permanently and totally disabled. The
only issue before the- Administrative Law
Judge was the proper apportionment between
Wicat Systems and the Second Injury Fund.
The A.L.J, determined that Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-69 (as amended 1984) controlled, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred
in 1983, and so computed Wicat's share of the
liability at 24/64ths or 37.59b. Wicat filed a
motion for review claiming that the 1981
version of section 35-1-69, which would
have placed its share of liability at 12/64ths
or 18.759b, should have instead been applied.
The Commission denied Wicat's motion.
The sole issue before us is whether the 1984
amendments to section 35-1-69 were procedural or remedial such that they could be
applied retroactively to an injury that occurred
before the effective date of the amendments.2
We hold that the amendments were not remedial, and, therefore, did not apply retroactively.
In workers' compensation cases, we generally apply the law existing at the time of
injury. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737
CE REPORTS
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State of Utah/

ORDER

Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 870222-CA

v.
Karen Marie Johnson,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the Appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 5th day of April, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

zl

Mary ^./Noonan
ClerkVf the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of April/ 1989/ a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the
following:
Debra K. Loy
Joan C. Watt
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South/ Suite 300
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111
Re Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Dan R. Larsen
(Argued)
Assistant Attorney General
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Julia C. Whitfield
Case Management Clerk

APPENDIX C

DEBRA K. LOY (3901)
attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN M." JOHNSON,

Case No. CR86-1728
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the defendant, KAREN M. JOHNSON, by and through her
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and hereby moves the Court to
Suppress all evidence seized from her person or property including
alleged amphetamines, alleged paraphernalia and alleged burglary tools
on the grounds said items were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her
person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah.
DATED this

o

day of January, 1987.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

A.

/

e-\_
DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above-entitled
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 16th day of January,
1987 at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable RAYMOND S. UNO.
DATED this

$

day of January, 1987.

*_ /iy /u
DEBRA K.

LOY

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt Lake
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
day of January, 1987.
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1

but I think it's crucial,if we're this far apart on what

2

the law is,that the Court see the careful analysis of

3

this issue.

4

THE COURT:

I am inclined to deny the motion,

5

but if you feel that you can find some case law that will

6

support it

—

7

MS. LOY:

I do.

8

THE COURT:

The cases that I have read, I

9

don't think would support a motion to dismiss in a fact

10

situation such as this where there was a legitimate stop

11

because of a light, the officer asked the driver if she

12

has a driver's license, she produces a driver's license,

13 Land the driver's license is suspended.
14

In addition to that, there's no registration

15

so there is no way of telling who the owner of the vehicle

16

is and whether they have permission to drive it, because

17

the owner is not present.

18

a reasonable officer would make inquiry regarding the

19

identification of a passenger in the event the vehicle

20

may be stolen.

21

stolen, but there are enough stolen vehicles to justify,

22

you know, reasonable inquiry by an officer.

23

thev let someone go. then they're in i-mnhlp. because

24

i-hgy havp Ipt- enough go that I know of.

25

And it would seem to me that

He doesn't know whether the vehicle is

MS. LOY:

Because if

Well, your Honor, I would ask the

35

1

Court then for the opportunity to submit a memorandum

2

because I think the Court, in its own analysis here, is

3

falling in a trap that we fall into frequently in considering

4

the passenger the same as the driver.

5

there are cases that distinguish that, and I would like

6

to provide that.

7

THE COURT:

And I think that

If you can find something, I would

8

be glad to read it, but at this stage, you know, I am

9

inclined to deny the motion.

But if you can convince

10

the Court that the Court is wrong in its analysis, then

11

I will be glad to read that.

12

MR. JONES:

13

MS. LOY:

14

I think we have a pretrial this

Friday, if I can submit —

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. LOY:

17

It's set for trial next Wednesday.

—

If you can have it by Friday.
a very brief memorandum with

our cases, I would appreciate the opportunity.

18

THE COURT:

19

[Hearing concluded.]

20

-ooOoo-

All right.

Okay.

21
22
23
24
25
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Because the officer's detention of Ms, Johnson was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the
detention violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

As a result, the evidence obtained as a result of the

initial illegal detention, including that obtained in the search of
Ms, Johnson's bag, should be suppressed in accordance with Terry v.
Ohio, supra.
POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
While the Utah Supreme Court has followed the Fourth Amendment
standard in deciding search and seizure cases argued under the Utah
Constitution, (See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1987),
nothing prevents Utah from analyzing this Constitutional provision
differently from the federal approach, especially in a case such as
this where there is no Fourth Amendment case on point.
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985), the
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska's
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme
Court under the federal constitution."

The Court in Jones chose to

apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska
law than is required under the federal constitution.
- 9

-

The Washington

Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d
136 (Wash. 1984).

In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington

Constitution provided greater protections then did the federal
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable
searches and seizures by police.

Id. at 143.

In State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978), an
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation, and ordered the
passengers out of the car.

As one of the passengers was getting

out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that:
(B)y stopping the automobile the police have decided
that the driver will be detained. Such is not the
case for the passenger, who has not broken the law
and who may walk away from the scene unless the
police officer has some other legitimate reason to
detain him. Certainly the passenger has a higher
expectation of privacy than the driver, because the
passenger plays no part in the routine traffic
infraction and has reason to suppose that any
exchange with the authorities will be conducted by
the driver alone.
The Williams Court, without deciding the Fourteenth
Amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution the
detention of the passengers was not permissible.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop
any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
The language of U.C.A. §77-7-15 indicates an intent on
the part of Utah's legislature to provide the citizens of this state

- 10 -

with greater protection than is provided by the federal constitution
as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, supra.
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a
person only when the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that
criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.

Hence, while

the United States Constitution may allow for police citizen
encounters absent a reasonable suspicion (See United States v.
Merritt, supra), the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise,
requiring a police officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop
and question a person.

Hence, Utah statutory and constitutional law

require a reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual,
even where the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment.
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson
when he detained her to run a warrants check (See discussion at 5-7)
(See also State v. Larocco, supra, for discussion of what
constitutes a "seizure").

The language of the statute shows that in

Utah, any detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name
amounts to a seizure.

However, even if this Court does not agree

that any detention where the officer asks a person for
identification amounts-to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and
constitutional law, the detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a
seizure of her person.

The officer detained Ms. Johnson for

anywhere from several to fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer
did more than merely obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's
identity.

He expected her to remain in the car while he ran a

warrants check; she was not free to leave and therefore was
- 11 -

detained.

As the Court in United States v. Luckett, supra, found

requiring a defendant to wait while a warrants check was run
constituted a detention.
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms.
Johnson.

The officer did know whether the car was stolen, nor did

he run a check to find out even though he had the opportunity to do
so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen (which it was not),
there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a crime which may have
been committed by the driver (See State v. Banks, supra).

The

officer had a hunch which later proved to be incorrect; a hunch does
not amount to a reasonable suspicion.
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section
77-7-15 (1953 as amended).

Pursuant to the statute, an officer must

have reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name
and address.

Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion

could have attached to Ms. Johnson.
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful
seizure should have'been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Johnson
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence.
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